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Does	it	matter	what	workers	do?	
The	role	of	workers’	relational	agency	in	the	hybridisation	of	
TNC	subsidiaries	in	China	and	Mexico		
Frido	Wenten1	fw4@soas.ac.uk	
1.	 Abstract	This	article	questions	if	the	issue	of	hybridisation	–	or	convergence	and	divergence	–	in	the	operations	of	global	car	producers	is	sufficiently	addressed	on	the	level	of	ideal	typical	“productive	models”	or	other	forms	of	static	ideal	types.	Arguing	that	there	are	difficulties	 in	accounting	 for	dynamic	change	and	process,	 I	suggest	a	shift	in	attention	to	processes	of	relational	agency	between	social	agents	on	and	beyond	the	shop	floor.	Based	on	empirical	evidence	on	the	Chinese	and	Mexican	subsidiaries	of	one	of	the	largest	global	car	manufacturers,	I	argue	that	in	these	relational	processes	worker	agency	has	to	be	considered	as	a	factor	that	shapes	institutional	change	and	variety,	as	well	as	the	actual	performance	of	shop	floor	institutions.			
2.	 Keywords	automotive	industry;	hybridisation;	convergence;	divergence;	workers;	labour;	agency;	China;	Mexico.		
3.	 Introduction		In	1990	the	MIT	study	The	Machine	that	Changed	the	World	(Womack	et	al.	1990)	proclaimed	the	inevitable	convergence	of	the	global	automotive	industry	in	a	“lean	production”	 paradigm.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 a	 parallel	 German	 research	 project	(Jürgens	 et	 al.	 1989)	 more	 cautiously	 suggested	 that	 the	 differences	 between	global	auto	producers’	production	and	sales	strategies	might	not	be	overcome	so	easily.	Over	time	the	“lean	production”	hypothesis	would	be	challenged	by	the	idea	of	persistent	divergence	in	company-specific	“profit	strategies”	and	“productive	models”	 (Boyer	 &	 Freyssenet	 2002;	 Freyssenet	 2009).	 Rather	 than	 a	 uniform	driving	 force	 towards	 convergence,	 the	 core	 assumption	 behind	 these	 twin-																																																								1 	Frido	Wenten	 is	 ESRC	 Postdoctoral	 Fellow	 of	 the	 “Global	 Challenges	 Research	 Fund“	 at	 the	Department	of	Development	Studies,	School	of	Oriental	and	African	Studies	(SOAS);	and	Fellow	at	the	Department	of	International	Development,	London	School	of	Economics	and	Political	Science	(LSE).	
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concepts	 was	 that	 automotive	 manufacturers	 develop	 their	 internal	 rules,	organisational	principles	and	market	orientation	in	accordance	with	the	national	institutional	 incentive	 structure,	 or	 “matrix”,	 of	 their	 respective	 home	 country	(apart	from	Boyer	&	Freyssenet	2002;	and	Freyssenet	2009;	particularly	Streeck	1992;	Streeck	&	Kenworthy	2005).			Consequently	arising	from	this	assumption	was	the	puzzle	of	what	occurs	when	a	transnational	 company	 with	 internal	 institutions	 modelled	 after	 the	 matrix	 of	home	 country	 A	 opens	 a	 subsidiary	 within	 the	 different	 matrix	 of	 destination	country	 B.	 This	 question	 triggered	 research	 interests	 beyond	 the	 “productive	model”	approach	proper,	in	particular	on	Japanese	TNCs	(e.g.	Abo	1994;	Boyer	et	al.	1998;	Kumon	&	Abo	2004).	The	shared	conclusion	was	that	as	a	rule	rather	than	full	application	of	 the	parent	company	model,	some	form	of	adaptation	to	local	specificities	occurs,	which	results	in	a	hybridised	model	for	the	subsidiary	plant.	Dominant	in	the	aforementioned	studies	has	been	an	interest	in	deciphering	the	actual	elements	that	converge	or	diverge	between	parent	and	subsidiary	plant,	in	order	to	construct	from	their	different	combination	certain	patterns,	models	or	types.	This	procedure	has	enabled	constructive	and	increasingly	complex	cross-	and	within-company	comparisons	(e.g.	Boyer	et	al.	1998;	Freyssenet	2009).	What	has	 attracted	 less	 attention	 though	 is	 the	 role	 of	 agency	 in	 the	 hybridisation	process	–	for	example	in	strategic	decision-making	or	the	day-to-day	operations	of	a	plant	–	that	could	help	to	move	from	comparative	static	modelling	to	causal	explanation.	What	is	more,	the	advances	that	have	been	made	in	this	direction	–	for	 example	 by	Kostova	 and	Roth	 (2002)	 or	Becker-Ritterspach	 (2009)	 –	have	introduced	 a	 perspective	 on	 processes	 of	 agency	 that	 focuses	 on	 vertical	interactions	between	management	of	parent	and	subsidiary	plant,	and/or	on	the	interaction	of	management	and	(local)	policy	makers.	What	has	remained	largely	absent	is	an	analysis	of	the	agency	of	non-elites	–	in	this	case:	workers.2		In	this	article	I	argue	that	worker	agency	–	in	relation	to	that	of	other	agents	–	has	the	potential	 to	deflect	managerial	strategy	 into	unintended	consequences;	and	defy	the	purpose	of	shop	floor	governing	 institutions.	On	the	one	hand,	certain	cataclysmic	 eruptions	of	 relational	 agency	 evoke	 institutional	 changes	 that	 are	inexplicable	 within	 an	 institutionalist	 framework	 alone.	 And	 on	 the	 other,	diverging	forms	of	everyday	practices	of	workers	and	managers	on	the	shop	floor	can	 alter	 the	 actual	 performance	 of	 institutions,	 helping	 us	 to	 explain	 actual	converging	or	diverging	dynamics	without	equating	these	to	functional	effects	of	a	 particular	 institutional	 design.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 actual	 performance	 of	institutions	or	“productive	models”	–	beyond	their	purposive	design	–	hinge	upon																																																									2	This	is	not	to	say	that	the	need	to	take	worker	agency	into	account	on	a	theoretical	level	has	not	been	acknowledged	(e.g.	Boyer	1998).	Empirically	though,	the	impact	of	worker	agency	has	rarely	been	researched	–	and	if	so,	has	mostly	been	substituted	for	an	analysis	of	the	agency	of	union	or	work	council	representatives	(e.g.	in	Jürgens	et	al.	1989).	
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how	 horizontal	 and	 vertical	 relations	 between	 managers	 and	 workers	 are	constituted	and	pan	out	in	reality.		After	 a	 revision	 of	 the	 shortcomings	 of	 the	 “productive	 model”	 and	 similar	approaches,	 the	 remainder	 of	 the	 article	 contrasts	 comparative	 statics	 on	technological	composition;	remuneration	systems;	the	organisation	of	work	and	time;	 and	 training	 processes	 at	 one	 of	 the	 largest	 global	 car	 producers’	subsidiaries	in	China	and	Mexico	to	past	and	present	agency	within	and	between	their	workforce	 and	management.	 It	 descends	 via	 three	 sections	 from	 a	more	significant	 instance	 of	worker	 agency	 shaping	 institutional	 change;	 to	 the	 less	visible	impact	of	everyday	forms	of	relational	agency	on	the	shop	floor;	and	to	the	contrasting	 case	 of	 absent	 worker	 agency	 in	 shaping	 the	 technological	composition	 of	 the	 production	 process.	 The	 information	 it	 draws	 on	 has	 been	obtained	through	shop	floor	observations	and	over	80	interviews	during	two	six-months	periods	of	fieldwork	in	each	Mexico	and	China	between	September	2012	and	 September	 2013.	 Problem-centred	 interviews	 were	 carried	 out	 with	participants	chosen	through	purposive	sampling,	according	to	function	and	status:	managers,	union	personnel,	permanent,	and	temporary	workers.	This	choice	was	made	 due	 to	 restricted	 access,	 at	 the	 cost	 of	 a	 statistically	 non-representative	sample.	 To	 approximate	 analytical	 representativeness	 of	 factual	 information,	interviews	were	undertaken	up	to	a	point	of	saturation,	when	common	themes	became	 visible	 and	 information	 overlapped	 significantly;	 and	 the	 information	was,	where	possible,	triangulated	with	company	or	other	official	records,	as	well	as	secondary	data	and	existing	studies	(e.g.	Lüthje	et	al.	2013;	Zhang	2014;	Juárez	Núñez	et	al.	2005).				
4.	 Limitations	of	ideal-typical	modelling		Profit	 strategies	 and	 productive	models	 are	 the	 result	 of	 decades	 of	 inductive	research	and	should	be	taken	as	“a	largely	unintentional	process	for	creating	an	external	 relevancy	 and	 internal	 coherency	 for	 […]	 technical,	 organisational,	managerial	 and	 social	 changes”	 (Boyer	 &	 Freyssenet	 2002,	 p.23).	 Once	conceptualised,	 they	 are	 essentially	 ideal	 types	 –	 or	 “heuristic	 devices”	(Hollingsworth	&	Boyer	1997,	p.20)	–	that	give	meaning	to	a	complex	reality	by	providing	 a	 template	 against	 which	 historical	 analogies	 and	 deviance	 can,	 in	Weber’s	 terms,	 be	 “comparatively	 measured”	 (Weber	 1988,	 p.199).	 As	Weber	recognised,	this	procedure	bears	the	danger	of	“telescoping	theory	and	history”	(ibid.	p.204),	that	is,	of	tailoring	history	to	the	properties	of	the	ideal	type.	And	what	he	suggested	as	a	solution	was	to	emphasise	that	logical	conceptualisation	and	empirical	reality	are	two	radically	different	and	incommensurable	domains.3																																																										3	This	 notion	 seems	 to	 be	 shared	 by	 at	 least	 some	proponents	 of	 the	 institutionalist	 tradition.	Hollingsworth	 and	Boyer	 for	 example	 argue	 that	 ideal	 types	 “are	 not	meant	 to	 be	 descriptive	
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	On	 this	 basis	Weber	 suggested	 a	 procedure	 shared	 by	 the	 “productive	model”	approach	 –	 and	 the	 institutionalist	 tradition	 more	 generally	 –	 that	 I	 call	
typologism:	 “comparative	measuring”	 results	 in	 the	 construction	 of	 new	 ideal-types,	or	at	least	sub-types,	in	each	case	of	historical	deviation.4	Reality	is	ordered	through	an	ever-increasing	number	of	types,	models	and	regimes,	which	combine	common	 elements	 in	 different	 ways.	 Surely	 this	method	 is	 a	 powerful	 tool	 to	debunk	myths	of	convergence	in	one	single	ideal	type	–	such	as	the	prediction	of	the	homogenous	spread	of	lean	production	across	the	entire	automotive	industry	(Womack	et	al.	1990).	And	it	also	gives	us	a	certain	“roadmap”	as	to	where	to	look	for	significant	elements	affecting	the	operations	of	a	certain	company.	However,	as	 in	Weber’s	method	of	 ideal	 type	 construction,	 there	 is	 a	serious	difficulty	 to	explain	 causality	 and	 process	 from	 the	 static	 character	 of	 a	 productive	model.	Even	 if	 we	 had	 the	 most	 complete	 list	 of	 elements	 that	 in	 their	 differential	combination	make	up	individual	ideal	types,	it	will	never	be	possible	from	within	this	logic	(alone)	to	actually	find	explanations	as	to	why	and	how	this	type	emerged	or	transformed	in	the	way	it	did.	Taking	this	back	to	the	initial	question,	there	is	a	range	of	factors	that	suggest	either	a	tendency	towards	convergence	or	towards	divergence	of	productive	models	between	a	parent	company	and	its	subsidiaries.	Table	1	lists	a	few	of	these	factors,	which	could	however	be	extended	at	will.			
Convergence	 Divergence	Technological	Rigidities	 Cost	and	Profitability	Shared	Platforms/Modular	Production	 Quantity/Quality	Global	standards	(e.g.	ISO	norms)	 Ownership	Structure	(Joint	Ventures?)	Free	Trade	Agreements	 Local	Market	Structure	Home	Country	Institutions	 Local	Institutions		Global	Suppliers	 Local	Suppliers	Open	Capital	Markets	 Labour	Supply	and	Skills	
Table	1:	Factors	suggesting	convergence	or	divergence	Factors	 such	 as	 shared	 platforms,	 technological	 rigidities	 (e.g.	 operations	requiring	particular	machinery),	 global	norms,	 the	 impact	of	 the	home	country	institutions	on	corporate	governance	etc.	suggest	that	companies	will	reproduce																																																									statements	about	specific	firms,	industrial	sectors,	or	individual	firms	at	specific	periods	of	time.	Rather,	they	are	heuristic	devices	to	sensitize	us	to	possible	interrelationships	that	might	exist	among	a	broad	set	of	variables	or	social	categories.”	(Hollingsworth	&	Boyer	1997,	p.20)	4	In	another	self-criticism,	Hancké	has	pointed	out:	 “One	of	 the	problems	with	such	expanding	typologies	is	that	ultimately	one	could	claim	that	every	capitalist	country	has	produced	its	own	‘variety’,	in	which	at	least	one	institution	or	combination	of	institutions	is	historically	specific,	and	therefore	different	from	other	related	types.”	(Hancké	2009,	p.15)	
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the	productive	model	of	 their	headquarters	abroad.	Cost	differentials,	different	market	structure	and	size,	local	regulations	and	norms,	a	different	model	range,	different	ownership	structure	in	case	of	joint	ventures	etc.	on	the	other	hand	are	factors	that	suggest	a	high	degree	of	divergence	in	the	productive	model	of	foreign	subsidiaries.	Naturally,	the	most	likely	outcome	in	any	empirical	case	is	some	form	of	 hybridisation	 that	 combines	 converging	 and	 diverging	 elements	 (Abo	 1994;	Boyer	et	al.	1998;	Kumon	&	Abo	2004;	Becker-Ritterspach	2009)	–	but	it	is	not	from	establishing	a	list	of	factors	itself,	or	from	their	particular	combination,	that	we	can	draw	conclusions	as	to	why	and	how	a	hybrid	productive	model	emerges.			If	these	models	are	strictly	speaking	the	final	result	and	not	the	starting	point	of	historical-empirical	inquiry,	then	factors	external	to	the	productive	model	must	exist	 that	 explain	 its	 emergence	 and	 transformations.	This	 paper	 suggests	 that	human	agency,	particularly	in	a	relational	form	between	social	groups,	becomes	an	 important	 analytical	 issue	 for	 (at	 least)	 two	 reasons.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 to	demonstrate	a	 causal	 relationship	between	 institutions/productive	models	and	behaviour,	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 institutional	 matrix	 require	 occasional	 empirical	reference	 to	what	 social	 agents	 “actually	 do”	with	 the	 constraints	 and	 options	provided	to	them.	On	the	other	hand,	in	order	to	explain	the	emergence	and	change	of	 institutions/productive	 model,	 the	 reverse	 relation	 needs	 to	 be	 examined,	namely	how	what	social	agents	“actually	do”	transcends	the	institutional	matrix,	which	 might	 lead	 to	 unintended	 dysfunctionalities	 or	 trigger	 institutional	adaptation.			
5.	 The	case	German	Company	X	developed	into	one	of	the	largest	global	producers	of	low	and	medium-priced	passenger	cars	after	World	War	II.	With	sales	of	5.04	million	units	in	the	first	half	of	2015	it	was	briefly	the	world’s	largest	car	manufacturer	(Cremer	&	Funakoshi	2015),	uniting	twelve	independent	motor	vehicle	brands	under	one	company	 group	 and	 running	 production	 facilities	 in	 21	 countries.	 In	 the	productive	model	approach,	Company	X	has	been	said	to	pursue	a	“volume	and	diversity”	profit	strategy,	characterised	by	the	mass	production	of	a	wide	range	of	models.	This	in	turn	rests	on	a	“productive	model”	of	polyvalently	skilled	workers,	quickly	 adaptable	 machinery,	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 outsourcing,	 and	 the	 ability	 to	quickly	 integrate	 innovations	 developed	 elsewhere	 (Boyer	&	 Freyssenet	 2002,	chap.6).	 Due	 to	 its	 public-private	 ownership	 structure	at	 the	 headquarters,	 its	cooperative	industrial	relations	and	extensive	collective	agreements	Company	X	has	also	been	 heralded	as	 an	 archetype	 of	 German	 “neo-corporatism”	(Streeck	1992;	Jürgens	2009).			
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Company	 X	 opened	 its	 first	 Mexican	 and	 Chinese	 plants	 in	 1964	 and	 1984	respectively,	mainly	with	the	aim	of	accessing	the	shielded	domestic	markets	of	the	two	countries	(Bennett	&	Sharpe	1985;	Thun	2006;	Chin	2010).	In	2015	the	company	 group	 operated	 three	 manufacturing	 plants	 in	 Mexico	 and	 fifteen	 in	China,	all	of	which	had	been	opened	after	2009	(Figure	1).			
	
Figure	1:	Company	X	corporate	structure	in	China	and	Mexico,	2015	Both	the	Mexican	and	Chinese	main	plants	are	comparably	large,	with	more	than	10,000	direct	and	5,000	indirect	employees	–	the	Mexican	main	plant	employed	a	total	 of	 about	 18,000	 workers	 in	 2012,	 while	 the	 main	 plants	 of	 the	 two	 join	ventures	of	Company	X	in	China	had	workforces	of	around	(JV1)	and	above	(JV2)	20,000	in	2013.	Around	a	quarter	of	direct	employees	were	temporary	workers	in	Mexico	 and	 at	 JV2,	 with	 no	 data	 being	 available	 for	 JV1.5	These	workers	were	directly	hired	by	Company	X	in	Mexico,	while	in	China	they	were	“dispatched”	by	labour	agencies.6	The	share	of	female	workers	in	production	was	low,	between	5%	in	Mexico	and	2%	at	JV2,	but	in	administrative	and	service	jobs	it	was	around	twice	as	 high	 in	 the	 Chinese	 JVs	 as	 in	Mexico	 (24/21%	versus	 12%).	 The	 subsidiary	assembly	plants	in	China	were	all	significantly	smaller,	with	projected	workforces																																																									5	Officially	JV1	does	not	employ	temporary	agency	workers.	This,	however,	is	only	partly	correct,	as	the	Chinese	side	of	the	joint	venture	runs	its	own	labour	agency.	Due	to	the	particular	ownership	structure	the	dispatch	workers	it	hires	do	not	appear	as	such	in	official	statistics.		6	To	speak	of	permanent	employment	for	the	Chinese	case	is	slightly	misleading,	because	directly	employed	workers	also	only	possess	temporary	(one	to	three	year)	contracts,	which	are	however	customarily	renewed	(see	also	Jürgens	&	Krzywdzinski	2015).			
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of	around	6,000	to	8,000	direct	workers	–	none	of	these	plants	ran	at	full	capacity	yet	in	2013.	Similarly,	the	new	Mexican	assembly	plant	that	began	to	be	staffed	in	2016,	 would	 have	 a	 smaller	 workforce.	 The	 majority	 of	 the	 workforce	 was	composed	 of	 residents	 from	 the	 surrounding	 areas,	 while	 in	 China	 temporary	workers	could	also	be	hired	from	distant	provinces	via	recruitment	agencies.7	The	most	significant	difference	between	the	Mexican	and	Chinese	ventures,	however,	was	 the	 age	 composition	 of	 the	workforce,	 with	 an	 average	 age	 of	 over	 45	 in	Mexico	and	around	or	even	below	30	in	China.	This	was	mainly	due	to	the	maturity	of	the	respective	plant	and	continuous	expansion	and	hiring	in	China.	Temporary	workers	 were	 in	 both	 cases	 in	 their	 early	 twenties,	 as	 they	 were	 hired	 from	vocational	schools	or	high	schools.8	Concealed	in	the	Chinese	case	is	however	the	fact	 that	 at	 least	 JV2	 made	 extensive	 use	 of	 student	 interns	 from	 vocational	schools,	who	worked	at	the	plant	for	either	six	months	or	a	year	and	were	in	their	late	teens	or	early	twenties.	Zhang	(Zhang	2014,	p.70)	estimates	that	interns	can	make	up	about	a	third	of	the	workforce	in	labour	intensive	departments,	which	was	confirmed	in	my	interviews.9			There	were	two	further	aspects	that	set	the	cases	apart.	First,	vertical	relations	within	management	 differed,	 due	 to	 the	 joint	venture	 structure	 in	 the	 Chinese	case.	 While	 the	 Mexican	 plant	 was	 staffed	 with	 single	 (usually	 Mexican)	department	heads,	each	department	in	the	Chinese	joint	ventures	was	headed	by	both	a	Chinese	manager	of	the	respective	SOE,	and	a	German	manager	of	Company	X.	Exempted	from	this	rule	were	Human	Resources.	This	meant	that	managerial	decisions	in	China	did	not	mirror	Company	X	decisions	in	a	one-to-one	fashion	–	and	that	 the	area	of	employment	relations	 in	particular	was	beyond	 immediate	influence	 (but	 also	 responsibility)	 of	 the	 German	 side.	 Second,	 Company	 X	 in	Mexico	had	an	independent	enterprise	union	with	a	rich	tradition	of	rank	and	file	activism,	strikes	and	campaigns	–	as	well	as	union	infighting	and	conflicts	between	grassroots	movements	and	union	leaders.	The	Chinese	trade	union	on	the	other	hand	 was	 tightly	 controlled	 by	 party	 and	 management,	 which	 is	 typical	 for	branches	of	the	All-China	Federation	of	Trade	Unions	in	state	owned	enterprises.	Neither	 workers	 nor	 union	 leaders,	 who	 held	 former	 or	 parallel	 managerial	positions,	 had	 any	 interest	 in	 using	 the	 union	 as	 a	 vehicle	 for	 interest	representation	or	worker	agency.10	These	relations	did	neither	differ	significantly	between	the	two	JVs	nor	between	subsidiary	plants	in	different	geographic	areas	of	China.	While	most	plants	of	JV1	are	concentrated	in	the	same	province,	JV2	has	subsidiaries	 in	West	and	South	China.	Because	 it	 is	 a	 large	 centrally	 controlled																																																									7	The	trade	union	chairman	of	a	JV2	subsidiary	estimated	that	around	90%	of	the	workforce	were	local	residents;	JV2U1.	8	This	is	not	a	statistically	representative	result,	but	an	estimate	from	interviews	with	workers.		9	It	was	not	possible	to	clarify	how	these	interns	count	towards	the	overall	employment	figures.	10 	Interviews	 with	 workers	 JV1DW1,4	 JV1FW2,3,5	 and	 JV2FW1,2;	 interviews	 union	 officials	JV2U1,2.	
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SOE,	its	trade	union	leaders	have	sufficient	leverage	to	refuse	adaptation	to	the	more	 reform-oriented	 environment	 in	 South	 China. 11 	If	 over	 time	 regional	differences	in	worker	agency	–	for	example	higher	labour	turnover	and	a	higher	propensity	 to	 strike	 in	 South	 China	 (Pringle	 2011;	 Chan	 2014;	 Elfström	 &	Kuruvilla	2014)	–	will	have	an	impact	on	the	recently	opened	Southern	subsidiary	of	JV2	remains	to	be	seen.		
6.	 Institutional	change	and	relational	agency	–	The	1992	strike	
in	Mexico	as	a	watershed	Before	I	shed	more	light	on	the	shop	floor	institutions	and	their	performance	in	Company	X’s	plants	 in	China	and	Mexico	 for	more	 recent	 times,	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	mention	 the	 in	many	 regards	 decisive	 turning	 point	 in	 the	 organisation	 of	 the	Mexican	main	 plant.	 In	 1992	 a	 newly	 elected	 union	 leadership	 signed	 a	 secret	agreement	 with	 Company	 X	 to	 experiment	 with	 meritocratic	 remuneration	schemes,	teamwork,	and	outsourcing.	This	sparked	a	month-long	wildcat	strike	against	management	and	union	leadership,	during	which	the	enterprise	fired	the	entire	workforce.	After	blacklisting	over	1,000	activists	it	rehired	the	remaining	12,000	 workers	 under	 a	 new	 collective	 contract	 that	 introduced	 the	aforementioned	institutions	across	the	board.	It	also	imposed	new	union	statutes	that	 eliminated	 the	 layer	 of	 shop	 stewards,	 who	 had	 been	 the	 backbone	 of	preceding	union	strength.	Crucial	to	the	escalation	of	the	conflict	was	that	for	the	preceding	 five	 years	 labour	 struggles	 had	 prevented	 the	 implementation	 of	structural	 and	 institutional	 changes,	 which	 the	 enterprise	 envisioned	 in	preparation	for	North	American	exports	after	the	closure	of	its	sole	US	production	site	in	1987	and	the	dawn	of	NAFTA.12			The	 analytical	 relevance	 of	 this	 event	 resides	 in	 two	 interrelated	 aspects	 that	demonstrate	the	explanatory	relevance	of	relational	agency.	First,	the	event	itself	was	neither	predictable	by	the	pre-1992	institutional	matrix,	nor	could	the	latter	explain	the	behaviour	and	strategies	of	different	stakeholders	during	the	conflict	(i.e.	structures/institutions	fail	to	explain	event	and	behaviour).	And	second,	the	actual	institutional	change	that	was	implemented	after	the	conflict	–	discussed	in	more	detail	 in	 the	next	paragraphs	–	 is	not	explainable	post	hoc	as	a	 functional	transition,	 but	 instead	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 strategic	 interaction	 of	 the	 different	stakeholders	involved	(on	this	point	I	share	much	of	the	argumentation	of	Pries	1993).	Some	of	the	old	institutions	where	abolished,	others	transformed,	and	new	ones	established	–	why	this	occurred	in	the	form	it	did	can	only	be	explained	from																																																									11	Interviews	city-	and	province-level	union	leaders	South	China,	SCU1,	2.	12	This	 conflict	 has	 been	well	 documented,	with	 different	 analytical	 conclusions	 (Juárez	Núñez	1993;	2006;	Pries	1993;	Healy	2008;	Wenten	2016).	Unfortunately	the	details	of	the	conflict	are	beyond	the	scope	of	this	article.	
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the	interactions	of	policy	makers,	managers	and	workers	(i.e.	institutional	change	is	driven	by	relational	agency).13		While	 we	 can	 therefore	 speak	 of	 an	 impact	 of	 worker	 agency	 on	 institutional	change	 in	 the	Mexican	 case,	 there	 is	 no	 equivalent	 event	 in	 the	 history	 of	 the	Chinese	JVs.	The	initial	implementation	of	shop	floor	institutions	in	the	Chinese	case	 has	 for	 the	most	 part	 been	 at	 pure	managerial	 discretion14	–	which	 does	however	not	preclude	that	worker	agency	might	have	an	impact	on	their	actual	day-to-day	functioning.		
7.	 Divergence	–	Conflict	and	compliance	in	the	organisation	of	
production	Beyond	 the	 occurrence	 of	 watershed	 events,	 I	 will	 emphasise	 that	 the	performance	or	effects	of	shop	floor	institutions,	once	implemented,	depend	on	how	 everyday	 forms	 of	 relational	 agency	 unfold.	 Essentially	 I	 suggest	 that	divergent	 forms	of	 this	agency	cause	a	divergence	 in	 institutional	performance.	The	 particular	ways	 production	was	 organised	 in	 the	 two	 cases	 depended	 the	actual	power	of	managers	and	workers	to	influence	strategic	decisions	and	day-to-day	operations	in	their	favour.	On	the	basis	of	a	closer	analysis	of	remuneration	systems,	training	practices	and	the	organisation	of	work	on	the	shop	floor,	I	will	stress	 three	observable	 forms	of	worker	agency	deflecting	managerial	 interests	into	unintended	results.	These	forms	are	routinized	bargaining	practices	through	established	union	structures;	open	or	silent	non-cooperation	and	refusal;	and	exit	strategies.	These	 forms	correspond	roughly	to	 thematic	areas	of	remuneration;	the	organisation	of	work	and	time;	and	training.			
7.1.	 Contracts	and	remuneration	In	 both	 China	 and	 Mexico,	 Company	 X	 had	 implemented	 meritocratic	 wage	systems.	 However,	 wage	 setting	 was	 a	 unilateral	 decision	 of	 the	 Chinese	management	in	JV1	and	JV2	–	although	the	union	leadership	was	consulted	in	the	decision	making	process	–	while	in	Mexico	collective	agreements	and	union-led	wage	 bargaining	 remained	 important	 institutions.	 The	 1992	 conflict,	 however,	had	severely	altered	and	curtailed	union	power.	In	both	cases,	the	real	workings																																																									13	The	 emphasis	 on	 a	watershed	 event	 differs	 from	 the	 leitmotiv	 of	 “punctuated	 equilibrium”	(North	&	Weingast	1989;	Weingast	2002)	or	“path-dependency”	approaches	(Mahoney	2000)	in	that	the	event	is	not	contingent,	and	neither	is	its	result	arbitrary	nor	“relatively	determined”	–	but	instead,	it	 is	the	outcome	of	a	specific	balance	of	forces	between	different	social	agents	and	the	processes	of	relational	agency	between	them.	14	That	 this	has	worked	 itself	out	 rather	smoothly	–	at	 least	 in	 the	post-WTO	period,	when	 the	restructuring	of	SOEs	and	related	protests	had	been	concluded	–	can	also	partly	be	attributed	to	the	 fact	 that	 in	 an	 expansive	 dynamic	 of	 opening	 new	 facilities	 new	 institutions	 can	 be	implemented	in	the	absence	of	any	worker	influence	(in	China).		
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of	meritocratic	remuneration	depended	on	their	implementation	in	the	particular	force	field	of	management-worker	relations	–	and	as	these	differed,	so	did	the	use	and	effects	of	broadly	similar	remuneration	systems.			Wages,	 working	 hours	 and	 tasks	 in	 Mexico	 were	 directly	 regulated	 by	 the	company-specific	 collective	 agreement,	 which	 was	 subject	 to	 annual	renegotiation.	In	2012	workers	were	grouped	into	23	bands	of	twelve	pay	grades,	ranging	 from	 $5,280	 to	 $18,156	 per	 month,	 depending	 on	 work	 area,	 status	(worker,	 specialist,	 team	 leader)	 and	 performance. 15 	These	 wages	 were	 the	second	highest	in	the	automotive	industry	in	Mexico	(Covarrubias	2014),	and	well	above	the	2012	Mexican	minimum	wage	of	$1,911	per	month.16		In	 the	 Chinese	 case,	 collective	 agreements	 had	 the	 status	 of	 a	 non-negotiated	baseline	 for	management-union	 relations,	 established	 at	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	enterprise.	Wages	 at	 both	 JV1	 and	 JV2	were	 regulated	 in	 individual	 contracts,	which	subdivided	them	into	base	pay,	benefits	and	allowances	and	the	so-called	“floating	wage”	–	the	latter	mainly	referring	to	efficiency	wages	and	premiums.17	Blue	 collar	workers	 at	 JV1	were	 subdivided	 into	 ordinary	 and	 skilled	workers	(Facharbeiter);	 and	 at	 JV2	 into	 five	 separate,	but	partly	overlapping	pay	bands	increasing	with	rising	skill	level	and	complexity	of	tasks	(for	a	detailed	discussion	see	Jürgens	&	Krzywdzinski	2016,	p.209ff.).	In	the	summer	of	2013,	the	base	wage	for	ordinary	workers	was	¥2000	at	JV1;	and	¥1,300	at	JV2,	which	in	both	cases	was	about	¥200	above	the	local	minimum	wage.	The	average	monthly	net	income	at	 JV1	was	¥4,000	 to	¥5,000	 (USD	 650-810)	 for	 ordinary	 formal	workers	 and	¥3,000	to	¥4,000	(USD	485-650)	for	dispatch	workers	in	2013;	at	JV2	the	figures	were	 ¥3,500-4,500	 (USD	 565-730)	 and	 ¥2,800-3,200	 (USD	 450-515),	respectively.18	This	 implies	 that	 up	 to	 50%	 (JV1)	 or	 even	 60%	 (JV2)	 of	 formal	workers’	monthly	 net	 earnings	 could	 depend	 on	 potentially	 variable	 overtime	
																																																								15	Company	X	in	Mexico	divides	the	workforce	into	three	categories:	ordinary	workers	(técnicos);	“specialist”	 workers	 (especialistas,	 similar	 to	 the	 German	 Facharbeiter),	 such	 as	 maintenance	workers;	and	team	leaders.	Ordinary	workers	can	climb	up	a	scale	of	sixteen	levels;	and	their	team	leaders	 an	 additional	 four.	 Specialists	 have	 an	 entry	 salary	 equivalent	 to	 the	 tenth	 level	 for	ordinary	workers	and	can	increase	their	salary	along	another	eleven	levels.	Specialist	team	leaders	are	grouped	into	two	levels	at	the	top	of	the	pay	grade.	The	lowest	level	salary	for	an	ordinary	team	leader	is	2.3	times	that	of	the	lowest	level	salary	for	an	ordinary	worker;	for	specialists	the	ratio	is	2:1.		16	Different	from	China,	it	is	not	merely	difficult	but	sheer	impossible	to	survive	on	the	Mexican	minimum	wage	as	a	single	source	of	income.	17	In	some	cases	“floating	wage”	also	includes	aspects	of	a	“functional	wage”,	i.e.	premiums	based	on	 a	worker’s	 rank	 (Lüthje	 et	 al.	 2013,	 p.67).	 The	 term	 “floating	wage”	 dates	 back	 to	 China’s	economic	reforms	in	the	1980s	that	allowed	SOEs	to	retain	a	certain	percentage	of	their	profits	for	redistribution	amongst	the	workforce.	The	percentage	of	the	floating	wage	in	the	overall	wage	bill	was	supposed	to	be	fixed	–	initially	at	no	more	than	5%,	which	by	1993	had	already	increased	to	23.3%	on	average	(Meng	2000,	p.83f.).	18	Information	gathered	from	workers’	payslips	and	interviews	with	workers	and	managers.	
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benefits,	individual	or	company	performance.19	Due	to	the	high	number	of	orders,	this	share	in	itself	was	however	relatively	stable.	Wages	at	Company	X	compared	favourably	 to	 Asian	 (i.e.	 Japanese	 and	 Korean)	 joint	 ventures	 with	 workers’	median	annual	cash	income	being	¥42,732,	but	were	rather	low	if	compared	to	other	 European	 and	 American	 companies	 (¥62,354)	 (Puxin	 Management	Consulting	Co.,	in	Zhang	2014,	p.76).		Although	both	Chinese	and	Mexican	remuneration	systems	were	strongly	based	on	performance	evaluations,	their	actual	functioning	compares	quite	differently.	In	 Mexico	 workers’	 climbing	 the	 pay	 grade	 depended	 fully	 on	 individual	appraisals,	 but	 the	 daily	 wage	 associated	 with	 each	 pay	 grade/band	 was	predetermined	by	the	collective	agreement	and	was	re-negotiated	each	year.	Any	additional	benefits,	allowances,	premiums	and	bonuses	were	calculated	as	ratios	of	the	respective	worker’s	daily	salary.	This	system	was	the	result	of	the	union’s	defeat	 in	 the	 1992	 conflict	 and	 the	 consequential	 abolition	 of	 seniority	wages.	While	 the	 allocation	of	 individual	workers	 to	 their	 respective	 grade/band	was	subject	to	(monthly)	meritocratic	evaluations,	collective	bargaining	over	annual	wage	 increases	 and	 the	 number	 and	 spread	 of	 pay	 grades	 was	 institutionally	retained.	Unless	the	enterprise	was	able	to	impose	a	pay	freeze,	all	workers	would	receive	an	annual	nominal	pay	rise	as	an	effect	of	collective	bargaining.		In	 China,	 most	 premiums	 and	 overtime	 pay	 were	 similarly	 calculated	 as	percentages	of	 the	base	pay,	but	 the	 latter	was	not	subject	 to	regular	collective	negotiations.	Upon	hiring,	workers	were	placed	in	certain	pay	grades	according	to	skill	 level,	tasks	and	employment	status.	In	addition	to	premiums	from	monthly	individual	 appraisals	 and	 overtime	 benefits,	 a	 major	 part	 of	 workers’	 income	depended	on	company	performance-based	bonuses	distributed	at	the	discretion	of	 the	 enterprise	 in	 the	 form	 of	 double	 wages	 and/or	 mid-year	 or	 year	 end	bonuses	(the	latter	alone	can	account	for	up	to	25%,	Lüthje	et	al.	2013,	p.55).20	Different	from	temporary	workers	in	Mexico,	dispatch	workers	in	China	were	not	eligible	for	the	full	amount	of	premiums	and	bonuses.	As	a	consequence,	salaries	amongst	individual	workers	showed	a	wide	spread	(a	point	stressed	as	well	by	Jürgens	&	Krzywdzinski	2016,	p.214ff.);	and	there	was	no	automatic	progression	in	income	of	any	sort.			The	 implications	 were	 twofold.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 workers	 in	 both	 cases	complained	about	nepotism	and	a	lack	of	transparency	in	the	appraisal	process,																																																									19	Calculations	based	on	workers’	payslips;	author’s	field	notes;	interviews	with	Chinese	workers	JV2FW1,	JV2DW2,3;	Chinese	managers	JV2CM1,2,3;	German	senior	manager	JV1GM.	20	Here	it	is	important	to	distinguish	between	“premiums”	that	depend	on	individual	appraisals;	and	“bonuses”	depending	on	company	performance.	Bonuses	were	distributed	to	the	workforce	in	times	 of	 high	 sales,	 without	 transparent	 procedure	 and	 without	 workers	 having	 a	 formal	entitlement	 to	 them.	 Complaints	 at	 JV1	 arose	 during	 the	 financial	 crisis,	 when	 the	 enterprise	reduced	these	bonuses,	interview	worker	JV1FW4;	online	forums.			
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although	 these	 grievances	 were	 more	 widespread	 amongst	 older	 Mexican	workers	 that	 had	 experienced	 the	 seniority	 system	 than	 amongst	 Chinese	workers.21	And	temporary	and	dispatch	workers	criticised	the	 limited	prospect	for	permanency	or	career	progression.	On	the	other	hand,	these	grievances	were	partly	channelled	into	complaints	to	the	union	administration	in	Mexico;	while	in	China	workers	either	accepted	 these	practices	or	sought	other	 forms	of	 coping	strategies,	such	as	a	venting	their	anger	 in	 internal	and	public	online	 forums,	a	reduction	of	effort	and,	 in	the	case	of	dispatch	workers,	exit.	However,	 that	 the	union	in	Mexico	had	the	institutional	leverage	to	influence	the	overall	pay	grades	did	 not	 necessarily	 translate	 into	 benefits	 for	 the	workforce	 either:	 in	 2002	 it	agreed	to	an	introduction	of	five	lower	pay	grades	that	cut	the	basic	entry	salary	by	50%.	This,	again,	was	a	deliberate	choice	by	the	union	to	pre-empt	a	replay	of	the	1992	events:		“Huge	 conflicts	 have	 not	 occurred	 since	 1992,	 because	 with	 us	 the	 enterprise	achieved	a	new	agreement	–	the	new	wage	levels	that	allowed	it	to	lower	labour	costs.	Why	did	we	sign	this	agreement	in	2002?	Because	we	thought	it	was	better	to	make	a	deal	than	to	risk	another	conflict.”22		In	sum,	in	Mexico	the	continuous	relevance	of	the	union	in	collective	bargaining	procedures	created	a	co-determined	mechanism	for	regular	wage	increases	that	ran	 parallel	 to	 an	 otherwise	 individualised	meritocratic	 system.	 However,	 the	crucial	point	is	that	this	institutional	legacy	in	itself	was	mere	potentiality	or	idle	capacity	–	it	still	depended	on	the	actual	constellation	between	union	leadership,	rank	 and	 file	workers	 and	management	 to	what	 effect	 these	 institutions	were	actually	 mobilised.	 In	 China,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 management	 retained	 full	discretion	 over	 wage	 setting	 and	 rather	 chose	 to	 keep	 workers	 motivated	 by	redistributing	bonuses	at	will.	This	system	seemed	to	have	worked	considerably	well,	given	that	Company	X	in	China	has	grown	near	continuously	and	is	usually	one	of	the	best	paying	employers	in	the	region.	It	remains	speculative	if	a	majority	decision-making	power	of	the	German	side	in	the	cases	of	JV1	and	JV2	would	have	altered	this	arrangement.	
7.2.	 Organisation	of	work	and	time	Although	within	 the	global	 automotive	 industry	 teamwork	has	been	applied	 in	manifold	forms	(Babson	1995;	Kochan	et	al.	1997;	for	a	conceptual	overview	on																																																									21	My	 interviews	 and	evaluation	 of	 online	message	 boards	 suggest	 that	 there	were	complaints	about	 the	 way	 performance	 evaluations	 were	 carried	 out	 in	 Company	 X’s	 Chinese	 JVs.	 This	contrasts	with	 the	 analysis	 of	 Jürgens	 and	 Krzywdzinski	 (2016,	 p.209ff.),	 who	 stress	 that	 the	transparent	 and	 fair	 nature	 of	 these	 evaluations	 led	 to	 widespread	 acceptance	 within	 the	workforce.	 It	 would	 require	 better,	 unrestricted	 access	 and	 larger	 sampling	 sizes	 of	 worker	interviews	to	answer	with	more	confidence	how	workers	actually	viewed	the	appraisal	system.					22	Interview	former	general	secretary	Company	X	union	Mexico,	MU2.	
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team	work	see	Schaper	2014),	in	ideal	typical	terms	the	team	in	a	lean	production	paradigm	should	be	the	responsible	unit	not	only	for	the	fulfilment	of	immediate	productive	 operations,	 but	 also	 for	 task	 assignment	 (including	 job	 rotation),	quality	 control	 (including	 responsibility	 for	 mistakes),	 self-evaluation,	 and	“continuous	 improvements”	 (CIP)	 of	 the	 production	 process.	 This	 is	 based	 on	polyvalent	 task	 ranges	 and	 multi-skilled	 workers	 within	 each	 team;	 and	 a	cooperative	“client	and	supplier”	philosophy	between	individual	workers,	teams	and	managers.	On	the	surface,	work	organisation	in	Mexico	and	China	resembled	to	lean	production	philosophies	of	teamwork	and	CIP.	However,	in	practice	these	rules	were	rarely	applied	by	the	book.			In	both	Mexico	and	China	teamwork	was	introduced	and	organised	in	a	top-down	fashion,	either	against	explicit	union	resistance	as	in	Mexico	in	1992	–	or	without	worker	involvement	throughout	the	gradual	enlargement	of	productive	capacity	during	the	1990s,	as	in	the	case	of	JV2.23	In	both	Mexico	and	China	teams	were	of	variable	 sizes	 (usually	 1:10	 or	 1:15)	 depending	 on	 the	 department	 and	workstation.	Each	team	had	a	skilled	worker	as	a	team	leader,	who,	unlike	in	the	German	plants,	was	in	both	cases	not	elected	by	the	team	members.	In	Mexico,	the	team	leader	was	the	worker	with	the	highest	pay	grade	in	his	team,	given	that	he	fulfilled	certain	performance	criteria	and	was	approved	by	the	enterprise.	In	China	advanced	workers	who	passed	all	performance	criteria	could	sit	examinations	to	qualify	as	potential	team	leaders,	to	be	appointed	by	the	shop	manager	if	a	vacancy	opened	 up	 (described	 in	 detail	 in	 Zhang	 2014,	 p.110).	 In	 both	 cases	 the	 team	leader	was	accountable	to	a	group	leader,	who	supervised	multiple	work	teams	and	represented	the	lowest	level	of	management.	Quality	circles	were	formally	in	place;	 and	 workers	 were	 asked	 to	 submit	 monthly	 suggestions	 for	 process	optimisations,	which	counted	towards	their	regular	performance	evaluations.24		The	 team	 leader	 supervised,	 instructed	 and	 evaluated	 the	 team	 members’	individual	 performance	 –	 the	 latter	 having	 an	 immediate	 effect	 on	wages	 and	promotions.	He	also	had	the	 freedom	to	re-assign	tasks	within	his	group,	while	higher	levels	in	the	hierarchy	could	re-assign	tasks	across	groups	and	overrule	the	decisions	 of	 team	 leaders.	 Neither	 in	 Mexico	 nor	 in	 China	 was	 job	 rotation	scheduled	 by	 a	 transparent	 procedure.	 It	 occurred	 on	 an	 informal	 basis	 at	 the	discretion	of	the	team	leader	after	consultation	with,	or	orders	from,	higher-level	managers.	In	addition,	and	against	the	principle	of	“waste	reduction”,	teams	at	JV2	were	 usually	 staffed	 with	 a	 higher	 number	 of	 workers	 than	 required	 for	immediate	productive	operations,	so	that	there	was	certain	flexibility	for	mutual	help	or	substitution.	This	was	likely	a	result	of	the	larger	amount	of	inexperienced	workers	on	the	production	line.																																																									23	Insufficient	data	is	available	on	how	this	process	unfolded	at	JV1.	24	Author’s	field	notes;	see	also	L.	Zhang	2014,	p.138;	Montiel	2001,	p.175ff.	
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		Formally,	in	both	China	and	Mexico	were	time	regimes	determined	unilaterally	by	the	 enterprise	 –	 the	 union	 in	 Mexico	 had	 lost	 its	 right	 to	 co-determine	 the	allocation	 of	 overtime	 or	 intensification	 of	 work	 in	 1992	 –	 including	 working	hours	 and	 days,	 shift	 length	 and	 rotation,	 and	 cycle	 time.	 The	 regular	working	week	in	Mexico	was	44	hours	for	the	day	shift,	42	hours	for	the	afternoon	shift,	and	40	hours	for	the	night	shift.	Day	and	afternoon	shift	included	a	half	an	hour	break;	the	night	shift	was	thirty	minutes	shorter;	and	shifts	rotated	on	a	monthly	basis.	JV1	followed	two	different	shift	systems:	a	three	shift	system;	and	a	two-shift	system	with	regular	working	days	of	variable	length	between	eight	to	eleven	hours,	in	which	workers	alternated	between	two	day	shifts,	two	night	shifts	and	two	 rest	 days.	 JV2	 had	 a	 three-shift	 system	with	 eight	 working	 hours	 and	 bi-weekly	rotation	and	a	working	week	of	6.5	days	–	that	is,	workers	had	one	day	off	every	two	weeks.	Cycle	times	were	unilaterally	determined	by	the	enterprise	and	varied	by	task	complexity.	In	newer	plants	in	China,	however,	all	processes	were	set	up	for	a	cycle	time	of	60	seconds.				Exhausting	 work	 rhythms	 were	 the	 most	 pronounced	 complaint	 amongst	 my	interviewees	in	both	China	and	Mexico.	In	Mexico,	however,	workers	I	interviewed	also	strongly	criticised	the	particular	work	organisation	for	two	basic	reasons:	a	general	sense	of	increasing	competition,	and	a	more	specific	frustration	with	job	rotation	 and	 alteration	 of	 work	 rules	 being	 at	 the	 sole	 discretion	 of	 the	enterprise.25	Because	teamwork	was	introduced	in	Mexico	against	the	will	of	the	majority	of	the	workforce	there	was	persistent	discontent	with	the	system.	The	union	committee	elected	in	2000	proposed	to	management	to	tackle	the	issue	by	involving	union	personnel	in	the	co-determination	of	work	rules	again.	The	refusal	to	even	consider	the	proposal	triggered	a	strike,	which	resulted	in	an	enlargement	of	 the	 number	 of	 section	 stewards,	 and	 a	 de	 facto	 re-vitalisation	 of	 grassroots	institutions,	such	as	the	general	assembly,	which	the	enterprise	had	abolished	in	its	rewriting	of	the	union	statutes	in	1992.	However,	no	institutional	response	to	workers’	demand	of	control	over	work	rules	was	made,	which	rather	aggravated	the	situation	of	silent	dissent	on	the	shop	floor	–	a	fact	that	was	not	only	confirmed	in	 interviews	with	workers	 and	 academic	 experts,	 but	 also	 by	 the	 existence	of	clandestine	groups	of	worker	dissidents	within	 the	plant.26	The	 result	was	 that	management	had	to	deal	with	recurring	instances	of	worker	refusal	(in	the	forms	of	wildcat	overtime	 refusals	 and/or	 complaints	 to	 the	union/HR)	 to	accept	 job	rotations;	long	working	hours;	forced	vacation	in	times	of	low	orders;	and	cycle	time	 reductions.	 For	 the	 latter	 the	 union	 tried	 to	 negotiate	 a	 compensatory	increase	 in	 workers’	 salaries	 in	 an	 ad-hoc	 manner;	 but	 no	 new	 formal	arrangement	emerged.	The	actual	functioning	of	teamwork	and	time	allocation	in																																																									25	Interviews	workers	MPW2-12.		26	Interviews	workers	MPW3,6,7,8;	Interview	Huberto	Júarez	Núñez;	author’s	field	notes.	
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Mexico	 is	 probably	 best	 characterised	 as	 a	 dysfunctional	 stalemate,	 in	 which	authoritarianism	 from	 above	 and	 evasion	 or	 resistance	 from	 below	 prevent	institutional	change	either	in	the	interest	of	workers	or	of	managers.	For	example,	despite	 incidents	of	 overtime	 refusals	 and	 complaints	 did	management	 not	 re-integrate	the	union	in	decisions	on	time	allocation	–	but	neither	has	it	(at	the	main	plant)	been	able	 to	 implement	 its	desired	 introduction	of	 time	accounts,	due	to	stern	opposition	from	the	workforce.			In	Mexico	the	recurring	back	and	forth	between	managerial	authoritarianism	and	workers’	strategies	of	 compliance,	 evasion,	or	resistance	were	 the	determining	factor	in	how	the	institutional	effects	of	teamwork	and	CIP	actually	materialised.	The	 enterprise	 thwarted	 workers’	 proactive	 contribution	 to	 CIP	 through	insufficient	monetary	and	career	incentives	and	in	particular	through	sustained	authoritarian	hierarchies,	which	resulted	in	reduced	effort	and	participation.	In	practice	 this	 counteracted	 ideal	 typical	 institutional	 effects	 and	 implied	 that	Company	X	in	Mexico	chose	to	operate	under	conditions	of	persistent	discontent	and	 pressure	 from	 below,	 while	 refraining	 from	 installing	 union-	 or	 other	mechanisms	that	could	function	as	safety	valves.		In	 China	 an	 assessment	 of	 the	 role	 of	worker	 agency	 in	 shop	 floor	 relations	 is	ambivalent	at	best.	While	Zhang	documents	a	small	number	of	instances	of	worker	refusal	and	suggests	an	image	of	widespread	grassroots	resistance	(Zhang	2014),	Jürgens	and	Krzywdzinski	 emphasise	workforce	 compliance	and	describe	 shop	floor	 relations	 at	 Company	X	 in	 China	 as	 “almost	 a	 paradise	 for	management”	(Jürgens	&	Krzywdzinski	2016,	p.256).	My	observations	and	interviews	in	China	suggest	 that	 a	 reduction	 of	 effort	 amongst	 ordinary	 production	 workers,	particularly	 interns	and	 temporary	workers,	was	widespread,	but	 that	 this	did	rarely	translate	into	openly	voiced	discontent	or	work	stoppages.27	Quality	circles,	however,	were	according	to	both	workers	and	management	largely	dysfunctional	due	to	a	lack	of	participation,	which	was	compensated	for	by	union-organised	skill	contests	and	prizes	for	particularly	productive	workers.	Overall,	labour	relations	in	 the	 Company	 X’s	 Chinese	 plants	 were	 rather	 stable,	 although	 they	 were	hierarchical,	unilaterally	 top-down	organised	and	offered	 little	participation	or	autonomous	work	organisation	to	workers.			
																																																								27 	At	 JV1	 a	 two-hour	 strike	 occurred	 in	 2011	 to	 demand	 improved	 pay	 for	 dispatch	workers	(interview	JV1DW1,2);	protest	was	openly	voiced	in	online	forums	after	the	lethal	accident	of	a	worker	on	the	shop	floor	in	2009	(Online	forums	baidu	tieba;	interviews	JV1FW2;	JV1DW1,2);	and	at	JV2	workers	protested	against	excessive	overtime	in	2009	(interview	JV2FW1,2).	
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7.3.	 Training	In	both	Mexico	and	China	Company	X	was	confronted	with	an	incompatibility	of	the	 respective	national	 education	 system	and	the	 skills	demanded	on	 the	 shop	floor.	And	in	both	cases	did	it	adopt	training	schemes	broadly	modelled	after	the	experience	of	its	operations	in	Germany.			In	Mexico	the	plant	had	established	its	own	on-the-job	training	processes	and	a	vocational	school.	In	the	latter	Company	X	trained	specialists	in	an	80%	technical,	20%	theoretical	scheme	adopted	from	the	German	dual	education	system.	In	2012	Company	X	had	extended	its	facilities	by	another	large	training	centre	for	workers	to	be	employed	at	newly	opened	production	sites,	in	particular	its	upscale	brand	plant	that	opened	in	2016.	Students	of	the	vocational	school	were	partly	trained	for	Company	X’s	own	demand	in	high-skilled	workers,	and	partly	for	its	suppliers	of	the	nearby	industrial	park.	Only	recently	has	Company	X	joined	a	certification	scheme	 of	 the	 German	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 that	 makes	 these	 degrees	transferrable.28			There	were	essentially	two	options	to	become	a	specialist	worker	at	Company	X	in	Mexico.	New	entrants	could	be	hired	as	specialists	if	they	were	graduates	from	a	 (preferably	 Company	 X’s)	 vocational	 school.	 To	 this	 end	 Company	 X	 offered	scholarships	 to	 graduates	 of	 (the	 better)	 high	 schools	 in	 the	 area.	 Ordinary	workers	on	the	other	hand	were	usually	required	to	have	a	high	school	degree	and	received	 a	 basic	 training	 on	 the	 job,	 under	 rules	 stipulated	 in	 the	 Collective	Contract	 and	monitored	 closely	 by	 union	 personnel.	However,	 if	 they	 received	good	performance	evaluations	and	qualified	for	a	company-internal	scholarship,	they	 could	 train	 to	 become	 a	 specialist	 concurrent	 with	 their	 (reduced)	participation	 in	normal	productive	operations.	Workers	 could	also	access	non-comprehensive	 individual	 courses	 if	 they	 gained	 particular	 premiums	 through	good	work	performance.29			In	 China,	 Company	 X	 did	 not	 establish	 its	 own	 vocational	 schools,	 but	 hired	graduates	from	Chinese	polytechnic	high	schools	and	colleges	and	trained	them	in	in-house	 processes.	 Separate	 rooms	 on	 the	 shop	 floor	 of	 the	 respective	departments	should	allow	for	training	in	basic	skills;	and	in	advanced	skills	where	a	 “professional	 training	 room”	was	 available.	 The	 training	 range	 at	 JV2’s	main	plant,	 for	 example,	 covered	 product	 and	 automation	 technology,	 project	management,	lean	training,	design,	management	training	and	foreign	languages.30		
																																																								28	I	thank	Judith	Wiemann	and	an	anonymous	reviewer	for	clarifying	this	point.	29	Interview	worker	MPW4.	 	30	At	JV1	certain	training	aspects	have	been	concentrated	at	particular	locations	–	one	of	the	newer	plants	in	the	East,	for	example,	is	responsible	for	all	aspects	of	lean	training.	
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Jürgens	 and	 Krzywdzinski	 (2015)	 describe	 in	 detail	 the	 pathways	 open	 to	ordinary	workers	and	skilled	professionals	in	pursuit	of	an	“expert”	career	within	the	enterprise.	My	observations	and	interviews	confirm	that	the	shortage	of	–	and	related	 need	 to	 retain	 –	 skilled	 personnel	 explains	 the	 development	 of	 expert	career	tracks	for	a	minority	of	workers.	However,	this	should	not	mislead	to	the	assumption	that	there	was	widespread	general	training	or	strong	imperatives	of	“lean	production”.	The	aspects	of	a	lean	system	that	would	have	demanded	worker	involvement	were	only	partially	applied	at	Company	X	in	China	(indicated	above	by	the	teamwork	system).	Active	participation	beyond	following	job	instructions,	as	well	as	high	skill	levels,	were	demanded	from	a	small	section	of	the	workforce	only.	 Instead,	 Company	 X’s	 rapid	 expansion	 in	 China	 necessitated	 a	 constant	intake	 of	 new	 workers	 for	 simple	 manual	 tasks	 associated	 with	 the	 strongly	Taylorised	 production	 process	 and	 limited	 model	 range	 that	 allowed	 for	production	lines	being	used	for	one	or	two	models	only.	All	new	workers	received	a	basic	training	in	motoric	functions;	the	operation	of	certain	tools;	techniques	to	avoid	production	mistakes;	how	 to	 fill	 in	operative	 sheets	etc.	But	 for	dispatch	workers	and	interns	it	could	be	drastically	reduced.	Dispatch	workers	at	JV2	were	supposed	 to	 be	 trained	 for	 two	 to	 four	 weeks	 before	 they	 were	 successively	integrated	 into	 regular	work	teams,	depending	on	models,	particular	 tasks	and	learning	 capacity	of	 the	 individual	worker.	 In	 fact,	however,	 their	 training	was	often	cut	short	to	a	few	days,	before	they	were	used	in	normal	operations.31	As	a	German	senior	manager	simply	put	it:	“it	is	learning	by	doing.”32		This	issue	entered	a	vicious	circle,	because	not	only	did	workers	complain	about	the	monotony	of	work,	but	migrant	dispatch	workers,	who	still	had	access	to	a	plot	of	 land	 in	 the	 countryside,	where	 likely	 to	 leave	 the	 plant	 after	 receiving	 their	annual	bonuses.33	This	section	of	 the	workforce	was	a	minority	only,	which	did	not	drive	the	turnover	rate	amongst	dispatch	workers	beyond	10%,	but	it	fostered	the	segmentation	of	skill	development.	Moreover,	and	more	generally,	the	content	of	 basic	 training	 schemes	 was	 not	 comprehensive,	 but	 geared	 towards	 the	demanded	productive	operations.	This	allowed	for	the	reduction	of	training	times	for	workers	designated	for	simpler	operations.	In	other	words,	Company	X	in	both	cases,	but	particularly	in	China,	tried	to	keep	training	limited	for	those	sections	of	the	workforce	that	were	most	likely	to	leave	voluntarily	and/or	functioned	as	a	buffer	in	times	of	economic	downswings.		
																																																								31	Interviews	migrant	dispatch	workers	JV2MDW5,6;	German	senior	manager	JV2GM3	(1).	32	Interview	JV2GM3	(1).	33	Interviews	JV2MDW5,6;	JV1DW3.	
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8.	 Convergence	–	Managerial	prerogatives	on	the	technological	
composition	of	the	production	process	Finally,	there	are	also	areas	of	the	production	process,	where	worker	agency	was	virtually	absent	or	of	little	effect.	This	concerned	in	particular	the	technological	composition	of	the	production	process	that	was	in	both	cases	fully	determined	by	managerial	decision-making,	with	little	possibility	for	workers	to	alter	it,	once	it	had	been	implemented.			Company	X	makes	 extensive	 use	 of	 shared	 platforms	 and	modular	 production,	with	the	aim	of	achieving	higher	economies	of	scale	and	the	ability	to	produce	each	model	at	every	location.	The	pressure	on	a	homogenisation	of	technological	and	operational	processes	across	different	plants	is	therefore	high.	On	the	one	hand,	certain	machinery,	such	a	laser	welding	for	the	roof	of	the	car,	has	to	be	–	and	was	–	present	at	all	plants	producing	state	of	the	art	models.	The	definition	of	the	same	welding	points	across	sheet	metal	parts	of	different	size	and	shape	on	the	other	hand	 allows	 for	 a	 further	 standardisation	 of	 tasks	 that	workers	 have	 to	 fulfil.	Overall,	 employed	 technology	 and	 tasks	 were	 very	 similar	 between	 different	factories	and	between	Mexico	and	China	–	with	two	exceptions.	First,	plants	 in	China	that	continued	to	produce	older	models,	which	would	sell	due	to	the	closed	domestic	market	and	large	public	orders,	would	manufacture	these	models	with	outdated	 technology.	 In	 2013	 the	 first	 press	 line	 that	 was	 relocated	 from	 the	closed	US	production	facility	in	the	late	1980s	was	just	being	dismantled	at	JV2	–	it	had	been	used	to	produce	a	1980s	model	until	2012.	Secondly,	automation	was	handled	much	more	flexibly	in	China	than	in	Mexico,	although	these	adaptations	took	place	in	essentially	one	department	only:	the	body	shop.	Automation	rates	in	the	body	shop	for	some	older	models	in	China	could	be	as	low	as	29%,	and	did	not	exceed	70%	even	for	state	of	the	art	models.34			This	convergence,	as	well	as	the	lower	and	more	varied	automation	rates	in	China,	was	explicable	by	unilateral	management	decisions,	 as	 its	prerogative	over	 the	implementation	of	technological	changes	was	unchallenged	in	both	cases.	In	the	1992	conflict	the	Mexican	union	had	lost	both	its	institutionalised	right	and	the	rank	and	 file	power	 to	de	 facto	 veto	 transformations	of	production	 technology.	After	this	date,	decisions	on	technological	change	were,	as	in	the	Chinese	case,	at	the	 unilateral	 discretion	 of	 management;	 and	 my	 interviews	 with	 union	representatives	and	workers	gave	no	indication	of	a	political	challenge	of	this	fact.	This	also	 implies	 that	 the	divergence	 in	automation	rates	between	the	Mexican	and	Chinese	 case	has	 less	 to	do	with	 industrial	 relations	 than	with	managerial	considerations	 of	 cost,	 quality,	 quantity,	 model	 range	 etc.	 –	 and	 with	 the	construction	date	of	the	respective	plant.	Indicated	by	the	deployment	of	state	of																																																									34	Author’s	field	notes.	
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the	art	 technology	with	the	erection	of	new	plants,	younger	Chinese	plants	will	most	likely	see	an	increase	in	automation	over	time,	with	the	phasing	out	of	older	models,	rising	wages	and	growing	pressure	on	productivity.	These	dynamics	had	already	been	present	for	decades	in	the	Mexican	case,	and	intensified	with	NAFTA.				
9.	 Conclusion	I	 have	 argued	 that	 hybridization	 or	 convergence	 and	 divergence	 between	 the	actual	operations	of	subsidiaries	of	transnationally	operating	car	manufacturers	are	 not	 mere	 expressions	 of	 different	 structural	 factors	 and	 institutional	constraints,	but	essentially	depend	on	the	question	of	what	social	agents	“actually	do”	with	them.	I	have	made	two	interrelated	arguments.	First,	the	watershed	event	of	the	1992	conflict	in	Mexico	demonstrates	that	approaches	based	on	ideal-type	construction	 lack	the	capacity	 to	properly	explain	 institutional	change.	 Instead,	the	new	 institutional	matrix	 that	 emerged	after	1992	 is	better	understood	and	analysed	 as	 a	 specific	 outcome	 of	 processes	 of	 relational	 agency	 between	managers/policy	makers	and	workers.			Second,	 I	 have	 acknowledged	 the	 virtue	 of	 static	 typologies	 in	 comparing	 the	different	shop	floor	arrangements	that	characterise	the	production	process	and	employment	relations	 in	 the	Mexican	and	Chinese	subsidiaries	of	Company	X.	 I	have	then,	however,	shown	that	the	institutions	themselves	are	mere	potentiality,	realised	only	when	acted	upon	by	managers	and	workers.	The	direction	of	 the	effects	of	this	agency	is	however	less	clear	and	not	easy	to	predict	–	meritocratic	remuneration	systems	in	China	and	Mexico	worked	differently	due	to	routinized	wage	bargaining	in	the	latter	case;	a	stalemate	between	workers	and	managers	over	task	and	time	allocation	emerged	in	Mexico	due	to	a	“state	of	inconformity”	in	 the	 workforce;	 and	 in	 China	 exit	 strategies	 of	 dispatch	 workers	 and	 the	segmentation	of	 training	schemes	entered	 into	a	mutually	reinforcing	dynamic.	These	 outcomes	 in	 institutional	 functions	 were	 not	 deducible	 from	 the	institutional	design	per	se	–	which	implies	that	there	is	no	way	around	analysing	the	actual	agency	of	all	stakeholders	involved	in	more	detail.	This	could	only	be	done	to	a	limited	degree	here	–	in	particular	the	short-	and	long-term	effects	of	the	1992	conflict	warrant	more	attention.			Finally,	 the	 argument	 established	 should	 not	 be	misunderstood	 as	 voluntarist:	institutions	 and	 structures	 do	 matter,	 because	 they	 can	 provide	 the	 medium	through	which	relational	agency	unfolds	–	they	can	be	conceived	as	“idle	capacity”	for	 agency.	 Similarly,	 the	 argument	 of	 this	 article	 is	 not	 a	 claim	 to	 reduce	hybridization	or	convergence/divergence	to	the	 impact	of	worker	agency	–	 the	agency	of	managers	and	policy	makers	clearly	matters,	and	is	likely	to	still	have	a	more	decisive	impact	on	the	outcome	of	processes	of	relational	agency,	due	to	a	
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higher	ability	to	mobilise	institutions	and	structures	in	their	interest.	The	point	remains,	 however,	 that	 this	 agency	 does	 not	 unfold	 in	 a	 social	 vacuum,	 but	 in	relation	to	that	of	non-elite	social	groups	–	and	that	an	adequate	explanation	of	social	 and	 institutional	 change	 in	 their	 concrete	 forms	 therefore	 requires	 the	inclusion	 of	 these	 forms	 of	 agency.	 While	 the	 virtues	 of	 comparative	institutionalist	 approaches	 are	 undeniable,	 a	 more	 agency-centric	 theory	 of	institutional	change	and	its	methodological	mirror	image	in	the	form	of	a	labour-inclusive	research	agenda	appear	as	promising	avenues	for	future	theoretical	and	empirical	research.		
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Productividad:	distintas	experiencias.	Mexico	City:	Universidad	Autónoma	Metropolitana,	Friederich	Ebert	Foundation,	pp.	139–147.	Juárez	Núñez,	H.,	Bueno,	C.	&	Rivero,	A.A.L.	eds.,	2005.	El	Auto	global:	desarrollo,	
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